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THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT IN SCOTTISH CRIMINAL TRIALS
The corroboration
requirement in Scottish
criminal trials: should it
be retained for some
forms of problematic
evidence?
By Fraser P. Davidson* and
Professor of Law, University of Stirling
Pamela R. Ferguson**
Professor of Law, University of Dundee
Abstract The merits of corroborated evidence in criminal trials have been hotly
debated in many jurisdictions, with most having now abandoned this
requirement. The Scottish government intends to do likewise—at a time when
some other jurisdictions are considering its reintroduction. This article considers
whether there is merit in retaining a corroboration requirement for two types of
evidence, namely for visual identifications and extra-judicial confessions. It
explores whether the introduction of a weighted jury majority, as the
government proposes, can compensate for the problematic nature of such
evidence. In respect of visual identification evidence, it is argued that any
safeguard which corroboration might have provided has been weakened by the
way in which the courts have developed the law. Alternative mechanisms for
improving the quality of such evidence are assessed. In relation to confessions,
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the article argues that increasing the jury majority is a poor substitute for
corroboration.
Keywords Evidence law; Corroboration; Scotland; Identification; Confession
The background
he case of Cadder v HM Advocate1 was a landmark decision by the UK
Supreme Court which established that suspects in Scotland who are
detained by the police for questioning have a right to a consultation with
a lawyer before and during such questioning.2 For the prosecution to attempt to
lead evidence of the answers given by a suspect who had not been advised of this
right was a breach of the suspect’s right to a fair trial, rendering such answers
inadmissible. As a result of the Cadder case the right to legal advice was enshrined
in legislation.3 Having availed themselves of their right to legal advice, many
suspects now respond to police questioning with a stock reply, declining to answer
‘on the advice of’ their solicitor’. This development is unsurprising; a similar
pattern of behaviour was to be seen when the right was introduced into English
law 25 years ago.4 However, English and Scottish criminal procedure differ in two
crucial respects which are pertinent to the issue of silence at the police station.
First, unlike in England,5 no adverse inferences may be drawn at trial in Scotland
as a result of a suspect’s refusal to respond to questions from the police. Secondly,
at present Scottish law retains a corroboration rule. This requires the ‘facts in
issue’ to be proved by two independent sources of evidence. Thus the prosecution
must establish: (1) that the crime was committed, and (2) that the accused was the
person who committed it, and must (generally) provide two independent sources
of evidence for each of these.6 In many cases one of the two sources of evidence
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1 2011 SC (UKSC) 13.
2 For a critique of the case see P. R. Ferguson, ‘Repercussions of the Cadder Case: the ECHR’s Fair Trial
Provisions and Scottish Criminal Procedure’ [2011] Crim LR 743; J. McCluskey, ‘Supreme Error’
(2011) Edinburgh Law Review 276. More supportive commentary includes F. Leverick, ‘The Supreme
Court Strikes Back’ (2011) Edinburgh Law Review 287; F. Stark, ‘The Consequences of Cadder’ (2011)
Edinburgh Law Review 293.
3 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 15A, inserted by the Criminal Procedure (Legal
Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010, s. 1.
4 By the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 58. For an assessment of the English law position,
see P. Pleasence, V. Kemp and N. J. Balmer, ‘The Justice Lottery? Police Station Advice 25 Years on
from PACE’ [2011] Crim LR 3.
5 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 34. See D. Birch, ‘Suffering in Silence’ [1999] Crim LR
769.
6 There are several statutory exceptions to this, generally relating to minor offences, e.g. Dog
Fouling (Scotland) Act 2003, s. 1(4). Where offences are aggravated by various forms of prejudice,
there need not be corroboration of the accused’s prejudice. See, e.g., Offences (Aggravation by
Prejudice) (Scotland) Act 2009, s. 1(4): ‘Evidence from a single source is sufficient to prove that an
offence is aggravated by prejudice relating to disability’.
T
would be a confession, or at least a partial admission, from the suspect. Thus the
recognition of the right to legal advice following Cadder largely removed one
common source of evidence and resulted in thousands of cases having to be
abandoned by the prosecution due to lack of corroboration.7
In October 2010 the Scottish government appointed Lord Carloway to undertake a
review of aspects of Scottish criminal procedure and in particular ‘the
requirement for corroboration and the suspect’s right to silence’. He published his
Final Report in November 20118 and the Scottish government then issued a
Consultation Paper.9 As had been widely predicted, both documents included the
recommendation that the corroboration rule be abolished.10 The rule has been
described as ‘one of the most notable and precious features of Scots criminal
law’.11 It is unsurprising therefore that major voices within the legal profession in
Scotland have been raised against the proposed abolition,12 or have urged further
reflection before such a step is taken,13 albeit that abolition also has its
supporters.14 Despite the widespread opposition, the Scottish government decided
that the case for abolition was established, and instead entered into a further
consultation in Reforming Scots Criminal Law and Practice: Additional Safeguards
Following the Removal of the Requirement for Corroboration (2012). This invited
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7 See R. M. White and P. R. Ferguson, ‘Sins of the Father? The “Sons of Cadder”’ [2012] Crim LR 357 at 358.
8 The Carloway Review: Report and Recommendations (2011), available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
Resource/Doc/925/0122808.pdf>, accessed 30 October 2013.
9 Scottish Government, Reforming Scots Criminal Law and Practice: The Carloway Report, Scottish
Government Consultation Paper (2012), available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/
0039/00396483.pdf>, accessed 30 October 2013. For commentary and critique see J. Chalmers and
F. Leverick, ‘“Substantial and Radical Change”: A New Dawn for Scottish Criminal Procedure?’
(2012) 75 MLR 837; P. R. Ferguson and F. E. Raitt, ‘A Clear and Coherent Package of Reforms? The
Scottish Government Consultation Paper on the Carloway Report’ [2012] Crim LR 909; and F. E.
Raitt, ‘The Carloway Review: An Opportunity Lost’ (2011) 15 Edinburgh Law Review 427.
10 Carloway Review, above n. 8, para. 7.2.55; Scottish Government, above n. 9 at para. 9.23.
11 G. H. Gordon, ‘At the Mouths of Two Witnesses: Some Comments on Corroboration’ in R. F.
Hunter (ed.), Justice and Crime—Essays in Honour of the Rt Hon the Lord Emslie (T & T Clark: Edinburgh,
1993) 33.
12 Senators of the College of Justice, Responses to the Carloway Review (2012) 22–6; D. J. C. Thomson, ‘A
Defence of Corroboration in Criminal Law’ (2012) Scots Law Times 7; G. Lindhorst and S. Merk,
‘Corroboration Revisited’ (2013) Scots Law Times 147.
13 Scottish Parliament, Justice Committee Official Record, 13 December 2011, 624.
14 Representatives of Scottish Women’s Aid and Victim Support supported abolition—see Scottish
Parliament, Justice Committee Official Record, 20 December 2011, 777–8. See also F. Crowe, ‘A Case
for the Abolition of Corroboration in Criminal Cases?’ (2011) Scots Law Times 179; P. Duff, ‘The
Requirement of Corroboration in Scottish Criminal Cases: One Argument Against Retention’ [2012]
Crim LR 513; F. E. Raitt, ‘Carloway: A View from the Academy’ (2012) SCOLAG 9. For an assessment of
the likely impact of abolition on sexual offences, see I. C. M. Cairns, ‘Does the Abolition of Corrobo-
ration in Scotland Hold Promise for Victims of Gender-based Crimes? Some Feminist Insights’ [2013]
Crim LR 560.
comment on what additional modifications to Scottish criminal procedure might
be required once corroboration was indeed abolished.15 Prior to the conclusion of
that consultation exercise, it brought before the Scottish Parliament the Criminal
Justice (Scotland) Bill, s. 57(2)16 of which provides that:
If satisfied that a fact has been established by evidence in the
proceedings, the judge or (as the case may be) the jury is entitled to
find the fact proved by the evidence although the evidence is not
corroborated.17
Obligatory corroboration warnings have long been abolished in England,18 but
trial judges retain discretion to caution juries of the dangers of convicting on the
basis of certain forms of uncorroborated testimony.19 Similar warnings may be
given in Canada, Australia and Ireland.20 Mandatory warnings are controversial, as
they may perpetuate beliefs in the inherent unreliability of certain types of
witnesses, such as women and children.21 There is no requirement in the Scottish
Bill for either mandatory or discretionary warnings, which is hardly surprising,
since Lord Carloway had recommended that no such warning be provided.
However, the Bill does not actually prohibit judges from issuing such warnings
where they feel it would be appropriate to do so. Thus it might be expected that the
Scottish judiciary would assert a discretion to issue such warnings, as in England.
4 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
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15 Additional Safeguards Following the Removal of the Requirement for Corroboration (2013), available at
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk//Resource/0041/00410935.pdf>, accessed 30 October 2013.
16 Note that while English Bills have ‘clauses’, Scottish Bills have ‘sections’.
17 This is subject to s. 58, which provides that s. 57 ‘does not affect the operation of any enactment
which provides in relation to the proceedings for an offence that a fact can be proved only by
corroborated evidence’. The Explanatory Notes (para. 139) give the example of s. 89(2) of the Road
Traffic Regulation Act 1984, which provides that a person cannot be convicted of speeding on the
uncorroborated evidence of one witness that he was breaking the speed limit.
18 Corroboration warnings were abolished in respect of children’s evidence by the Criminal Justice
Act 1988, s. 34; and in respect of accomplices, and complainants in alleged sexual offences, by the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 32. Corroboration remains a requirement in English
law for offences such as perjury: see the Perjury Act 1911, s. 13.
19 Guidance on when warnings ought to be given was provided in R v Makanjuola [1995] 1 WLR 1348.
For a history of the corroboration warnings in English law, and a critique, see D. J. Birch, ‘Corrobo-
ration: Goodbye to All That?’ [1995] Crim LR 524. See also P. Mirfield, ‘Corroboration After the 1994
Act’ [1995] Crim LR 448.
20 P. Lewis, ‘A Comparative Examination of Corroboration and Caution Warnings in Prosecutions of
Sexual Offences’ [2006] Crim LR 889; S. Leahy, ‘The Corroboration Warning in Sexual Offence
Trials: Final Vestige of the Historic Suspicion of Sexual Offence Complainants or a Necessary
Protection for Defendants?’ (2014) 18 E&P 41.
21 C. Backhouse, ‘Skewering the Credibility of Women: A Reappraisal of Corroboration in Australian
Legal History’ (2000) 29 University of Western Australia Law Review 79.
Weighted jury majorities
The Bill introduces a potential safeguard against miscarriages of justice, following
the abolition of corroboration, by requiring that a two-thirds majority of a jury
must be in favour of a guilty verdict.22 This recognises that the criminal justice
system is an integrated structure, so that while Scotland might have been unique
in retaining a general corroboration requirement, it was equally unique among
adversarial systems in allowing an accused to be convicted on a bare majority—at
present, only 8 out of 15 jurors require to favour conviction for a verdict of ‘guilty’
to be returned. Section 70 therefore provides:23
A jury of 15 members may return a verdict of guilty only if at least 10
of them are in favour of that verdict … Where … a jury has fewer than
15 members, it may return a verdict of guilty only if—(a) in the case of
14 members, at least 10 of them are in favour of that verdict, (b) in the
case of 13 members, at least 9 of them are in favour of that verdict, (c)
in the case of 12 members, at least 8 of them are in favour of that
verdict.
It has been suggested that enactment of this section would ‘ensure that the
weakest cases, where the level of dissent amongst jurors means that the
accused’s guilt cannot fairly be said to have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, would not proceed to conviction’.24 While this may be true, the whole
issue of ‘simple’ versus ‘weighted’ jury majorities has no application to the great
majority of trials, since they are conducted under summary procedure, where
there is no jury. It seems to have been assumed that corroboration is not a vital
safeguard, and no adjustments need be made to compensate for its demise,
where the fact-finder in a trial is a professional judge.25 Our focus, however, is on
jury trials, where the dangers posed by problematic forms of evidence are more
acute.
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22 See Policy Memorandum for the Bill, paras 172–175.
23 This would insert a new section (s. 90ZA) into the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.
24 J. Chalmers and F. Leverick, ‘Majority Jury Verdicts’ (2013) Edinburgh Law Review 90, 95.
25 For a robust refutation of this argument see D. J. Cusine, ‘To Corroborate or Not To Corroborate’
(2013) Scots Law Times 79, where the author states: ‘Most of my previous experience of dealing with
criminal cases was as a sheriff; most of these cases were summary cases and I am not in any doubt
about the need to retain corroboration and the likelihood of miscarriages of justice were it to be
removed’ (ibid.).
Problematic forms of evidence26
Since it is likely that corroboration will be abolished, there seems little point in
continuing to argue in favour of its retention as a generally applicable
requirement.27 Instead, this article considers whether there is merit in providing
for limited exceptions: ought a corroboration requirement to be retained for two
types of evidence, namely for confessions and visual identification evidence? In
exploring the problematic nature of these forms of evidence, it is important to
bear in mind the various mechanisms by which the Scottish courts have diluted
the corroboration rule. As Peter Duff has so memorably put it, they have employed
numerous ‘refinements, exceptions, loopholes and pure “fiddles”’, in order to
carve out exceptions, or weaken the application of corroboration.28 Duff makes a
strong and eloquent case that as it currently operates in Scottish trials, corrobo-
ration offers far less of a safeguard for accused persons than many non-lawyers
might suppose. We entirely agree with this view. In considering, then, whether
one or both of these two types of evidence ought to form an exception to s. 57, we
must also consider whether it is enough to retain the requirement as it currently
operates—or whether a strengthening of corroboration is also required.
(a) Eyewitness identification evidence29
Identification may not be an issue at trial, for example, where an accused is
pleading self-defence to an assault or homicide charge, or consent in a rape trial,
but where it is at issue, a distinction may be made between cases in which the
accused is well known to the victim, and the circumstances are such that there
was ample opportunity for the witness to see the perpetrator, and those cases in
which identification rests on less solid foundations. In the former case, the
veracity of the witness may still be in doubt—a witness who states categorically
that her husband punched her; that she saw her neighbour trampling her prize
roses; or that her boss forced her to have sexual intercourse may be lying, but if she
6 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
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26 For a detailed description of the Scottish law of evidence, see F. P. Davidson, Evidence (SULI:
Edinburgh, 2007).
27 The arguments for and against abolition have been skilfully examined in D. Nicolson and J.
Blackie, ‘Corroboration in Scots Law: “Archaic Rule” or “Invaluable Safeguard”?’(2013) 17 Edinburgh
Law Review 152. For other contributions to the debate, see above nn. 12–14.
28 Duff, above n. 14.
29 Identification of the accused as the perpetrator may of course arise as a result of inferences drawn
from circumstantial evidence, such as DNA evidence and fingerprint evidence. Equally, it has been
established since McGiveran v Auld (1894) 21 R (J) 69 that an accused can be identified as the
perpetrator by a witness testifying that he recognised the accused’s voice. In England it has been
accepted that such evidence is even more problematic than eyewitness evidence, so that a jury
requires to be given a particularly emphatic warning about the dangers of relying on such
evidence—R v Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183. See also D. Ormerod, ‘Sounds Familiar? Voice Identifi-
cation Evidence’ [2001] Crim LR 595.
is telling the truth then it is unlikely that her identification of the perpetrator is
mistaken. In contrast to this, where a witness and perpetrator were not
acquainted before the incident, then it is far more likely that even an honest
complainer may be mistaken. In such cases, miscarriages of justice can and do
occur. Likewise, where the witness caught but a ‘fleeting glance’ of the perpe-
trator, misidentification may occur, even when the accused is someone to whom
the witness is well known. The Scottish courts have recognised the problematic
nature of such evidence; indeed it has been stated that where a prosecution
depends on eyewitness identification, ‘the risk of a miscarriage of justice is
notorious’.30 This echoes the view of the Criminal Law Revision Committee in
England, who regarded ‘mistaken identification as by far the greatest cause of
actual or possible wrong convictions’.31 It might be added that, at least histori-
cally, the methods of identification adopted by the police often exacerbated the
problem by leading witnesses towards identifying a particular suspect and
rejecting any other identification.32
It has been suggested that wrongful convictions may result from two types of
eyewitness identification errors. The first of these has been referred to as a
‘primary identification error’:
Radically different models have been proposed to explain phenomena
of memory and forgetting, but all theories acknowledge that
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 7
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30 Gage v HM Advocate [2011] HCJAC 40 at [29], per LJ-C Gill.
31 Criminal Law Review Commission, Evidence (General), 11th Report, Cmnd 4991 (1972), para. 196. See
to similar effect the Report of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases
(1976) para. 8.1. Research from the United States similarly suggests that mistaken identifications
account for more miscarriages of justice than all other causes combined: G. L. Wells, ‘Eyewitness
Identification: Systemic Reforms’ (2006) Wisconsin Law Review 615 at 615.
32 See Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395. See also J. Doris (ed.), The Suggestibility of Children’s Recollections:
Implications for Eyewitness Testimony (American Psychological Association: 1990); I. McKenzie and
P. Dunk, ‘Identification Parades: Psychological and Practical Realities’ in A. Heaton-Armstrong,
E. Shepherd and D. Wolchover (eds.), Analysing Witness Testimony (Blackstone Press: Oxford, 1999);
G .L. Wells and D. S. Quinlivan, ‘Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures’ (2009) 33 Law
and Human Behavior 1. Thus, e.g., if a witness has identified someone from police photographs as a
possible perpetrator, and then identifies the same individual at an identification parade, it is
very likely that the witness’s recollection of the perpetrator is based on the photograph as much
as the memory of the criminal event. Yet the witness will feel reinforced in the certainty of the
identification by the fact that the same individual has been picked out twice—see B. L. Cutler and
S. D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification: The Eyewitness, Psychology and the Law (Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge, 1995) 110; G. L. Wells, M. Small, S. D. Penrod et al., ‘Eyewitness Identification
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads’ (1998) 23 Law and Human Behavior
603.
observers frequently make inaccurate identifications of things and
persons.33
A key problem is that even when observers have an absolutely perfect view of an
event or person they interpret rather than straightforwardly record what they
are seeing,34 while their memory of what they have seen is unconsciously
adapted over time.35 Thus, there may, for example, be a tendency to persuade
oneself that a person one sees is actually someone whom one knows, while in
one’s memory of that event the individual perceived becomes more and more
like that person.36 Moreover, while it is commonly supposed that an individual is
more likely to recall an event vividly and accurately if it is especially traumatic,
the reverse is actually true.37 It is also the case that the prejudices of the witness
may significantly distort perception,38 and, even when not prejudiced, observers
are much less accurate when identifying members of racial groups different to
their own.39 A second error may occur when the fact-finder, particularly if this is
a jury, assesses the identification evidence and affords it more weight than it
merits,40 since juries tend to place great weight on identification evidence.41
Their faith in such evidence may often be misplaced, but it is usually difficult to
assess whether the confidence of a witness in making a positive identification is
8 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
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33 M. H. Hoffheimer, ‘Requiring Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification Evidence at Federal
Criminal Trials’ (1989) 80 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 585 at 587. See generally Cutler and
Penrod, above n. 32; D. M. Thomson, ‘The Realities of Eyewitness Identification’ (1982) 14 Australian
Journal of Forensic Sciences 150.
34 G. M. Davies, ‘Mistaken Identification: Where Law Meets Psychology Head On’ (1996) Howard Journal
of Criminal Justice 232.
35 K. L. Scheppele, ‘The Ground Zero Theory of Evidence’ (1998) 49 Hastings Law Journal 321.
36 E. F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Harvard University Press: Cambridge MA, 1979) 40. It can be
appreciated that this is doubly unfortunate for the individual identified, since a jury is likely to
be more impressed by the identification if he was not a stranger to the witness. Of course, it
would be a different matter if ‘the witness’s identification evidence is that the accused was his
workmate whom he has known for 20 years and that he was conversing with him for half an
hour face to face in the same room’, per the Privy Council in Beckford v R (1993) 97 Cr App R 409 at
415.
37 See generally Cutler and Penrod, above n. 32 at 103–4.
38 Loftus, above n. 36 at 39; J. W. Shepherd, J. B. Deregowski and H. D. Ellis, ‘A Cross-Cultural Study
of Recognition Memory for Faces’ (1974) 9 International Journal of Psychology 205; R. Lindsay and
G. Wells, ‘What Do We Really Know About Cross Race Eyewitness Identification?’ in S. M.
Lloyd-Bostock and B. R. Clifford (eds.), Evaluating Witness Evidence (Wiley: Chichester, 1983).
39 See generally Cutler and Penrod, above n. 32 at 104.
40 Hoffheimer, above n. 33 at 588.
41 B. L. Cutler et al., ‘Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evidence’ (1990) 14 Law and Human
Behavior 185; K. A. Deffenbacher and E. F. Loftus, ‘Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding
Concerning Eyewitness Behavior?’ (1982) 6 Law and Human Behavior 15.
well founded,42 and since such witnesses tend to be absolutely certain of the truth
of what they are saying, cross-examination is rarely an effective means of testing
the value of such evidence.43
The problems of identification evidence may be compounded in Scotland, as in
contrast to certain other adversarial jurisdictions,44 Scots law still allows for dock
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of a crime.45 Sometimes the
purpose of this is simply to confirm that the person in the dock is indeed the
person whom the witness has previously identified as having committed the
crime.46 However, sometimes dock identification takes a different form, where a
witness ‘has not previously been asked to make an identification at an identifi-
cation parade and ... does not claim previous acquaintance with the person
identified’.47 The Scottish High Court of Justiciary has recognised that such dock
identification is
open to the criticism [that] ... the accused ... can always be said to
have helped the eye-witness to believe he was the same person whom
the eye-witness originally observed in incriminating circumstances.
Not only does a dock identification lack the safeguards that are
offered by an identification parade but it positively increases the
risk of wrong identification by suggesting to the witness that the
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 9
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42 J. C. Brigham and R. K. Bothwell, ‘The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications’ (1983) 7 Law and Human Behavior 19; G. Wells and R. Lindsay, ‘How Do
People Infer the Accuracy of Memory Testimony?’ in S. M. Lloyd-Bostock and B. R. Clifford (eds.),
Evaluating Witness Evidence (Wiley: Chichester, 1983); and G. Wells and L. Murray, ‘Eyewitness
Confidence’ in G. Wells and E. F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1984
43 As Belzil J put it in R v Atfield (1983) 25 Alberta LR (2d) 97 at [3], ‘the danger of mistaken visual identi-
fication lies in the fact that the identification comes from witnesses who are honest and
convinced, absolutely sure of their identification and getting surer with time, but nonetheless
mistaken. Because they are honest and convinced, they are convincing’.
44 For example, England—see R v Hunter [1969] Crim LR 262, CA. Nevertheless, it seems to be permitted
because of practical considerations in magistrates’ courts, and in this context it has been held not
to be incompatible with Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—see Karia v
DPP (2002) 166 JP 753.
45 Cases which have challenged this as being in breach of Art. 6 of the ECHR have been unsuccessful to
date. See Holland v HM Advocate [2005] UKPC D 1; Scott v HM Advocate [2007] HCJAC 68; McNally v HM
Advocate [2012] HJAC 156; and C v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 139.
46 So in Bruce v HM Advocate 1936 JC 93 a number of witnesses indicated that they had seen ‘the
accused, James Bruce’ committing the offence, but none actually pointed him out in court. It was
held that he had not been properly identified, Lord Wark remarking that ‘identification of an
accused is not a matter which ought to be left to implication’ (ibid. at 95).
47 C v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 139 at [12].
person in the dock is the person who is said to have committed the
crime.48
In Brodie v HM Advocate49 Lord Justice-General Gill indicated that a trial judge
should normally instruct the jury on the particular dangers of dock identification.
These might include the fact that the witness is identifying someone they saw only
once, perhaps some considerable time previously, that dock identification lacks
the safeguards inherent in an identification parade, and that the accused is
indeed sitting in the dock. However, the failure to give such a direction did not
lead to the conviction being overturned in that case, as it was considered that it
had made no real difference to the verdict.
Some years ago the Departmental Committee on Criminal Procedure in Scotland
in its Second Report suggested that identification parades should replace dock
identification, and that dock identification should not be competent where the
witness had failed to identify the accused at a parade.50 However, this was never
acted upon. Thus in Dudley v HM Advocate51 the court rejected the argument that
where there had been no identification parade, it was unfair to allow the
complainer to identify the person in the dock as the perpetrator, since there was
effectively only one person who could be identified, the court having been cleared.
Very occasionally, questions surrounding dock identification will be an element
in a finding that an accused’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR has
been breached. Such was the finding of the Privy Council in Holland v HM Advocate52
where the witness identified the accused in the dock, having previously identified
two stand-ins but not the accused at an identification parade, and having been
informed by a police officer thereafter that she had ‘not done very well’. This latter
fact was not disclosed to the defence, nor was the fact that criminal charges were
10 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
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48 Ibid. For a commentary on the case, see C. M. Shead, ‘Dock Identification: The Case of C v HM
Advocate’ 2012 SCL 937.
49 [2012] HCJAC 147.
50 Scottish Home and Health Department and Crown Office, Criminal Procedure in Scotland (Second
Report) Cmnd 6218 (1975) paras 46.10 and 46.13, available at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/
Doc/925/0110006.pdf>, accessed 30 October 2013.
51 1995 SCCR 52.
52 [2005] UKPC D 1. Lord Rodger described an argument that dock identification automatically
infringed Art. 6, since it breached an accused’s privilege against self-incrimination by compelling
him to assist the prosecution, as ‘devoid of merit’ (at [36]). However, it might be different if ‘when
in the dock, the accused could be required to assist prosecution witnesses by, say, standing up, or
turning round, or showing part of his body. But nothing like that is permitted’. Lord
Justice-General Hope in Beattie v Scott 1991 SLT 110 at 113 had earlier opined that an accused could
not be asked to do anything in the witness box to assist identification.
outstanding against the main Crown witnesses. Lord Rodger opined that both
these failures to disclose were:
properly to be seen not as separate and isolated infringements of
Article 6(1), but as infringements that each had a bearing on [the] dock
identification of the appellant, which was one of the central elements
of the prosecution case ... [T]he dock identifications carried with them
significant risks of mistake over and above the risk of mistake which
go with any eyewitness identification evidence.53
However, this case is exceptional, Lord Rodger pointing out that ‘there is no basis,
either in domestic law or in the Convention, for regarding [dock identification]
evidence as inadmissible per se’.54 Thus various subsequent decisions have upheld
the fairness of this form of identification, the High Court noting in Wilson v Service:55
‘As the Privy Council confirmed in the case of Holland, dock identification remains a
perfectly legitimate procedure even where, at some stage in the past, a witness has
failed to pick out the accused at a formal identification parade’.56 Moreover, the
High Court in C v HM Advocate57 quoted Lord Rodger in Holland: ‘While one cannot
exclude the possibility that, in an extreme case, the judge could conclude that
admitting dock identification evidence would inevitably render the trial unfair,
normally the requirements of Article 6 will not raise any issue of admissibility’.58
The court therefore focused on whether the appeal in front of it was ‘an extreme
case’, and concluded it was not.59
Given the risk of miscarriages of justice, trial judges in Scotland should direct
juries on the problematic nature of identification evidence. However, in McAvoy v
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53 [2005] 1 SC (PC) 3 at [84].
54 Ibid. at [57].
55 [2011] HCJAC 91.
56 [2011] HCJAC 91 at [5]. Admittedly, this was not a case where dock identification was the first
formal identification. The complainers had attended the police station to witness a formal identifi-
cation parade, but this had been cancelled when they had encountered the accused at the station
and immediately identified him to the police. See also McNally v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 156: the
fact that the witnesses had failed to pick out the accused in a video identification parade by
electronic recording did not make the dock identifications unfair, since they were reinforced by
the fact that one of the witnesses had recognised the accused in the street some months after the
incident.
57 [2012] HCJAC 139 at [12].
58 [2005] UKPC 1 at [41].
59 [2012] HCJAC 139 at [14]. Emphasis was placed on the fact that while there were several dock identi-
fications, the complainer had also ‘picked out the appellant from a photographic emulator sheet
and therefore any identification that she makes in court will be subject to the sort of safeguard
which is provided by an identification parade’.
HM Advocate60 while Lord Justice-Clerk Ross noted that ‘the trial judge may feel it
desirable to remind the jury that errors can arise in identification’, he continued,
‘precisely what the trial judge says in this connection is a matter for his discre-
tion’.61 Such discretion was also emphasised in Blair v HM Advocate62 where the
court rejected the contention that the trial judge had erred in failing to charge the
jury that identification was an issue to which they required to direct their minds
with particular care, Lord Justice-General Hope indicating that ‘no fixed formula
requires to be followed’63 in dealing with identification evidence. What then
might be said about such evidence? The ‘careful’ directions to the jury in McLean v
HM Advocate64 were upheld by the appeal court. The trial judge had drawn
attention to the fact that ‘mistakes about identification have been made in court
cases in the past and these have to be guarded against’, but added that ‘it does not
follow … that mistakes have been made here. You will have to judge the soundness
of the identifications in this case. You will need to take special care in assessing the
quality of this evidence’.65 He advised the jury:
to regard the identification evidence as acceptable, you do not need
to conclude that the witnesses have made 100% cast iron certain
identifications. But you would need to be satisfied that you can rely
on the substance of what each witness said. Please remember this:
evidence of identification is a matter for great care. No evidence is
more convincing and none perhaps is easier to get genuinely
wrong.66
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60 1991 SCCR 123.
61 Ibid. at 131.
62 1994 SLT 256.
63 Ibid. at 259. This was a case where the judge had spoken about identification at the outset of his
charge. Where the trial judge says nothing at all about identification where it is clearly an issue
then that probably amounts to a misdirection. Such was the case in Webb v HM Advocate 1994 SLT
170 where, despite the fact that the witnesses were very drunk and were claiming to have
identified the accused from a distance of 60 yards in the early hours of a February morning, the
judge made no mention of the dangers of identification evidence.
64 [2011] HCJAC 99.
65 Ibid. at [4].
66 Ibid. In England where a case rests on disputed identification evidence, the trial judge has to warn
the jury of the need for caution before convicting on the basis of such evidence, explaining how it
can be inaccurate, and making reference to its strengths and weaknesses in the case in question: R
v Turnbull [1977] QB 224. Similar views have been expressed on other Commonwealth jurisdiction:
Mezzo v R [1986] 1 SCR 802; Auckland City Council v Bradley [1988] 1 NZLR 103; Domican v R (1992) 173
CLR 555. See also Kingsmill Moore J in People v Casey [1963] IR 33 at 39.
While it might be difficult for a judge to say much more, it is suggested that this
nevertheless underestimates the unreliability of identification evidence, and in
particular does not explain how and why it might be unreliable.
Moreover, the jury will not have the benefit of expert evidence on the point. In
Gage v HM Advocate67 a car which had been set on fire was found near the locus of
the crime. An eyewitness gave a description of the perpetrator’s clothing which
did not match that found in the car, but she later identified the latter clothing as
that worn by the perpetrator when the police showed her a mannequin wearing
the items. Another witness identified a car he had seen at the locus as a different
make to the one recovered by police, but, when shown the vehicle at the police
station, agreed it was similar. At trial, the first eyewitness made a dock identifi-
cation of the accused on the basis of his eyes, the perpetrator’s face having been
partially obscured. On appeal it was sought to lead evidence from an expert
witness who would testify as to the unreliability of such eyewitness testimony,
particularly in light of the strongly suggestive nature of the identification proce-
dures adopted. The High Court ruled against the admissibility of this evidence for
various reasons, but primarily because expert evidence ‘is admissible only if it is
necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute’ and in a case of this kind it is
necessary only if the tribunal of fact would be unable to reach a sound conclusion
without it.68
More importantly, however, the court suggested that expert evidence on
eyewitness identification was generally inadmissible in Scotland.69 There were
various reasons for this. First, the credibility and reliability of a witness’s evidence
was ‘for the jury to decide . . . on the basis of the jurors’ own assessment of the
witness’. Secondly, a safeguard exists in that the jury is always given ‘a specific and
thorough direction that warns them that in certain circumstances such evidence
may be unreliable’. Thirdly, ‘the defence can highlight the potential unreliability
of eye-witness identification in cross-examination of the relevant witnesses and
lead evidence of objective physical factors that might affect the reliability of the
identification in question’. Finally, it was thought that if such evidence were to be
admissible, the defence would lead psychological evidence, which the Crown
would then seek to rebut. The result would be that trials would be considerably
prolonged, while the ‘focus of the trial would shift’ to ‘the conflicting expert views
and on the cogency of the research evidence on which they were based’. Moreover,
‘[e]xpert evidence of that kind would of course be centred on the weaknesses of
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68 Ibid. at [22].
69 Ibid. at [27].
identification evidence rather than on the factors that enhance its cogency in any
individual case. In our opinion, it would create a climate of disbelief’.70
It should be noted that a similar approach is taken in most other adversarial
systems,71 and it is one which is far from illogical.72 Nonetheless, this lack of expert
assistance, coupled with the tendency, noted above, of juries to set particular store
by such evidence, makes it doubtful how much impact such warnings have.73 In
this context, the fact that juries tend to be convinced by such evidence means that
the requirement of a two-thirds majority in favour of a guilty verdict is unlikely to
represent much of a safeguard. Indeed the studies regarding the dangers of this
type of evidence have all occurred in jurisdictions where similar safeguards are
already in place.
An example of how reliance on such evidence can lead to miscarriages of justice is
found in an American case where a man served 14 years’ imprisonment for a crime
he did not commit, ultimately being acquitted on the basis of DNA evidence:
Though … the rape victim … spent more than forty-five minutes with
her attacker in her brightly lit home, spoke to him face-to-face, and
took special care during the attack to make careful observations and
notes in her mind of all the attacker’s identifying characteristics, …
[she] identified the wrong man in a photographic identification, in a
line-up, and at trial. She claimed to be ‘100% certain’ of her identifica-
tions on all three occasions.74
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70 Ibid. at [28]–[32].
71 US v Ginn 87 F 3d 367 (1996); R v Audy (No. 2) (1977) 34 CCC (2d) 231; Smith v R (1990) 64 ALJR 588. See
also O. Holdenson, ‘Admission of Expert Evidence of Opinion as to the Potential Unreliability of
Evidence of Visual Identification’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University LR 521; G. Vallas, ‘A Survey of
Federal and State Standards for the Admission of Expert Testimony on the Reliability of Eyewit-
nesses’ (2011–2012) 39 American Journal of Criminal Law 97.
72 M. R. Leippe, ‘The Case for Expert Testimony about Eyewitness Memory’ (1995) 1 Psychology, Public
Policy and Law 909; A. D. Yarmey, ‘Probative v Prejudicial Value of Eyewitness Memory Research’
(1997) 5 Expert Evidence 89.
73 Cutler and Penrod, above n. 32 at 263 suggest the impact is minimal. See also R. C. Lindsay, G. L.
Wells and C. M. Rumpel, ‘Can People Detect Eyewitness and Identification Accuracy Within and
Across Situations?’ (1981) 66 Journal of Applied Psychology 79.
74 D. A. Sonenshein and R. Nilon, ‘Eyewitness Errors and Wrongful Convictions: Let’s Give Science a
Chance’ (2010–11) 89 Oregon Law Review 263 at 264. Much earlier and equally remarkable in a
different way was the case of Adolf Beck, who was convicted of fraud on two separate occasions,
having been wrongly identified by 11 different witnesses in relation to the first offence and by four
in relation to the second: P. Hill, ‘A Century of Consistency’ (1998) 148 NLJ 1028. A Scottish example
some years later is Oscar Slater who was convicted of murder after he was wrongly identified by
two witnesses as leaving the house where the murder took place, and by another 12 as having been
watching the house.
It has been suggested that corroboration of eyewitness identification ought to
be required in the USA.75 It would be ironic if Scotland were to dismantle this
important safeguard at a time when other jurisdictions are considering its
reintroduction.
Yet how much of a safeguard is a corroboration requirement in respect of visual
identification evidence? Lord Justice-General Emslie has summarised the
approach of the Scottish courts in Ralston v HM Advocate:76 ‘where one starts with an
emphatic positive identification by one witness then very little else is required.
That little else must of course be evidence which is consistent in all respects with
the positive identification evidence’.77 In other words, it is not necessary that at
least two witnesses positively identify the accused as the perpetrator. Thus if one
witness does so, the requirements of corroboration are met if another witness
testifies that the accused has the same build as the perpetrator,78 or is the same
height and hair colour as the perpetrator.79 Indeed it was enough in one case that
the corroborating witness indicated that the accused resembled the perpetrator in
terms of basic looks.80 Lord Justice-General Rodger observed:
It is … a common experience for people to notice that someone
resembles another person even though they cannot pinpoint exactly
why that should be so. This is hardly surprising since resemblance
depends on many factors ... One may often notice the resemblance
without consciously registering the factors which give rise to it ...
Indeed it may be the overall impression of similarity, rather than any
particular set of factors, which really gives rise to the resemblance
between two people.81
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75 S. G. Thompson, ‘Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identifi-
cation Testimony’ (2007–8) 41 University of California at Davis Law Review 1487. For a cautious
endorsement of this suggestion, see D. Crump, ‘Eyewitness Corroboration Requirements as
Protections against Wrongful Convictions: The Hidden Questions’ (2009–10) 7 Ohio State Journal of
Criminal Law 361. In certain circumstances the Supreme Court of California had insisted on corrob-
oration of eyewitness identification—see People v Gould 354 P 2d 865 (1960), although it later
abandoned this position (People v Cuevos 906 P 2d 1290 (1995)).
76 1987 SCCR 467.
77 Ibid. at 472, per Lord Justice-General Emslie.
78 Nelson v HM Advocate 1988 SCCR 536.
79 Murphy v HM Advocate 1995 SCCR 55. In an early study where participants were asked to estimate an
actor’s height, there was a difference of two feet between the highest and lowest estimate, while 50
per cent of subjects overestimated the actor’s height by at least five inches: D. S. Gardner, ‘The
Perception and Memory of Witnesses’ (1933) 18 Cornell LQ 391 at 408.
80 Adams v HM Advocate 1999 JC 139.
81 Ibid. at 140–1.
In Kelly v HM Advocate82 the corroborating witnesses picked out the accused at an
identification parade as resembling the man she had seen in terms of build, hair
colour and hair length. She had also picked out another individual as resembling
the man she had seen, yet the court saw this as no barrier to her evidence having
corroborative effect. Lord Justice-Clerk Cullen opined:
The evidence which a witness who speaks only to resemblance is able
to contribute is as to the fact of that resemblance and the respect or
respects in which it existed. It follows from this and from the fact that
the witness was unable to make a positive identification that more
than one person could be the subject of a similar observation, and
that evidence as to resemblance does not of itself conflict with
evidence of positive identification given by another witness. No doubt
the weight which should be attached to the evidence which a witness
is able to give as to resemblance is a matter which juries will have to
consider. However, it is not fatal that more than one person is picked
out [as] resembling the individual in question.83
It may not even be necessary for the supporting eyewitness evidence to be evidence
of the commission of the crime. In Gracie v Allan,84 for example, the supporting
evidence was of the accused acting suspiciously not far from the location of the
crime not long after it had been committed. There is also the question of how
positive the primary identification evidence, which is corroborated by the ‘weak’
identification evidence, has to be. It is clear that the witness does not have to be
entirely certain that the accused is the perpetrator. It amounts to a positive
identification if the witness says that the accused is ‘very like’ the person they saw,
as in the Gracie case.85 The same is true if one witness testifies to being ‘eighty per
cent’, and another to being ‘seventy-five per cent’ sure that the accused is the
person they saw, as in Nolan v McLeod.86
Of course, as the quote from Ralston emphasises, even weak identification
evidence must be consistent with the positive identification evidence. So in Reilly v
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82 1998 JC 35.
83 Ibid. at 37–8.
84 1987 SCCR 364.
85 Ibid. See also MacNeill v Wilson 1981 SCCR 80—a witness identifying the accused as driving a vehicle
was corroborated by a witness who saw him checking the vehicle.
86 1987 SCCR 558. However, in MacDonald v HM Advocate 1997 SCCR 116, a statement that the accused
‘doesn’t look unlike’ the perpetrator could not be treated as a positive identification: ibid. at 119,
per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross.
HM Advocate87 when the evidence of the supporting witness flatly contradicted the
positive identification evidence by describing the perpetrator as bearded when the
main witness had described him as clean shaven, there could be no corroboration
of identification. On the other hand, there can still be sufficient corrobora-
tion where the accounts of two witnesses contain contradictory elements. So in
Robertson v HM Advocate,88 in which two witnesses insisted that they had seen the
accused commit the crime, it did not matter that they differed in their views of
what he was wearing. It would appear that the accused’s apparel was not the main
criterion of identification here. Presumably, corroboration of identification could
not occur if two witnesses were adamant that the accused was the perpetrator, but
contradicted each other regarding the main identifying feature(s).89
It can be appreciated then that the retention of the corroboration requirement as
far as visual identification evidence is concerned would not per se offer much of a
safeguard in quite a number of cases. If it were to be retained, it might be
strengthened if at least two witnesses were required positively to identify the
accused, although it might be no easy task to frame such a rule, and it is difficult
to predict how the judiciary would interpret a term such as ‘positive’ in this
context. However, the real problem with visual identification evidence is related
to its very nature. While some miscarriages of justice have involved a single
positive identification, others have seen an accused identified by several
witnesses. No doubt in broad terms the more witnesses who can identify an
accused, the more likely it is that the identification will prove to be accurate, but
given that such evidence is often inherently suspect because of the factors
mentioned above, the mere extent of visual identification evidence is no
guarantee of accuracy. A fortiori then, retaining a corroboration requirement
represents a fairly small step in dealing with the problematic nature of such
evidence.
Of course, there can be no question of preventing a case being proved solely on the
basis of visual identification evidence; despite its generally problematic nature,
there will be situations where the accuracy of the identification is not in doubt,
and the only issue is the veracity of the witness. More generally, as Henry J noted in
R v Pattison:90
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87 1981 SCCR 201.
88 1990 SCCR 142.
89 Gordon, above n. 11; B. S. Jackson, ‘Susanna and the Singular History of Singular Witnesses’ (1977)
Acta Juridica 37.
90 [1996] 1 Cr App R 51.
It is universally recognised that mistaken visual identifications have
in the past led to wrongful convictions. But any law that said that no
person could be convicted on visual identification evidence alone
would lead to ... ‘affronts to justice’ and to serious consequences to the
maintenance of law and order.91
It may therefore be that legislators should be concentrating on improving the
quality of identification evidence through such devices as the guidelines provided
for the authorities under Code D of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 in
England,92 and that corroboration in this context is more of a red herring.
Lord Carloway claimed that his Review represented an ‘opportunity … to explore
the possibility of introducing radical changes to some of the fundamental
precepts and principles of the criminal justice system’.93 We suggest that the Bill
represents an opportunity to strengthen aspects of the law of evidence. In 2004,
the Scottish Parliament recognised the legitimacy of admitting expert psycho-
logical or psychiatric testimony. Thus the relevant legislation now provides:
‘Expert psychological or psychiatric evidence relating to any subsequent
behaviour or statement of the complainer is admissible for the purposes of
rebutting any inference adverse to the complainer’s credibility or reliability as a
witness which might otherwise be drawn from the behaviour or statement’.94 The
Scottish Parliament ought to consider enacting a similar provision, allowing
evidence to be led from experts in the field of identification, in appropriate cases.
Rather than trial judges merely warning of the dangers of accepting uncorrobo-
rated identification evidence, such testimony could explain the inherent
unreliability of the human memory in certain types of situations. This may prove
to be a stronger safeguard against miscarriages of justice than the existing
corroboration requirement.
(b) Confession evidence
The second area where consideration might be given to the retention of a corrobo-
ration requirement relates to evidence of an extra-judicial confession. English law
has never seriously entertained the prospect that confessions should require to be
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91 Ibid. at 53.
92 For analysis of Code D, see A. Roberts, ‘The Problem of Mistaken Identification: Some Observations
on Process’ (2004) 8 E&P 100.
93 Carloway Review, above n. 8, Foreword, at 3.
94 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 275C(2), inserted by the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland)
Act 2004. ‘Complainer’ is the Scottish equivalent to an English ‘complainant’.
corroborated. In 198195 and again in 1993,96 law reform commissions recom-
mended against introducing any sort of corroboration requirement. The latter
commission did recommend that juries ought to be warned to be careful about
convicting on the basis of a confession alone,97 but this recommendation was not
followed. In contrast to this, currently in Scots law, the fact that an accused has
previously confessed to the crime does not obviate the need for corroboration. As
Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson expressed it: ‘There is a rule in our law … that short of
a solemn plea of guilt, an admission of guilt by an accused is not conclusive
against him, unless it is corroborated by something beyond the actual admis-
sion’.98 Moreover, corroboration must be found other than in the fact of confession
itself. Confessing to more than one person or repeating the confession on different
occasions does not amount to corroboration.99 Of course, if s. 57 of the Bill is
enacted, corroboration will no longer be required, and a conviction could be
obtained on the basis of a confession alone. This may be thought entirely appro-
priate, since there is surely no more significant evidence against an accused than
his confession. Yet, while Scotland is (currently) unique in retaining a general
corroboration requirement, it is not the only jurisdiction to have a corroboration
requirement in relation to confessions. Most US states maintain such a
requirement100 in order to avoid ‘errors in convictions based on untrue confessions
alone’.101 According to the US Supreme Court, the foundation of the corroboration
requirement:
lies in a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in the
realization that sound law enforcement requires police investigations
which extend beyond the words of the accused. Confessions may be
unreliable because they are coerced or induced, and although
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95 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Cmnd 8092 (1981) para. 4.74.
96 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Cm 2263 (1993). The Commission took note of empirical
studies—primarily Corroboration and Confessions: The Impact of a Rule Requiring That No Conviction Can
Be Sustained on the Basis of Confession Evidence Alone, Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research
Study No. 13 (1993)—which suggested that only a small percentage of cases would be affected by a
corroboration requirement, although it conceded that ‘the absolute numbers would
nevertheless be quite high’ (at 65, para. 70).
97 Ibid. at paras 76–80
98 Sinclair v Clark 1962 JC 57 at 62.
99 See, e.g., Bainbridge v Scott 1988 SLT 871.
100 See C. J. Ayling, ‘Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safeguards Against
False Confessions’ (1984) Wisconsin Law Review 1121. Military law also requires confessions to be
corroborated: see J. W. Moore, ‘The Corroboration Quandary: A Historical Overview of the
Interpretation of MRE 304(g)’ (2011) 67 Armed Forces Law Review 89.
101 Warszower v US 312 US 342 at 347 (1941). For an argument that all states should require
confessions to be corroborated, see B. Sangero, ‘Miranda is Not Enough: A New Justification for
Demanding “Strong Corroboration” to a Confession’ (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2791.
separate doctrines exclude involuntary confessions from consider-
ation by the jury … further caution is warranted because the accused
may be unable to establish the involuntary nature of his statement.
Moreover, though a statement may not be ‘involuntary’ within the
meaning of this exclusionary rule, still its reliability may be suspect if
it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investi-
gation—whose words may reflect the strain and confusion attending
his predicament rather than a clear reflection of his past.102
While the federal position103 and that of certain states104 is that the requirement
only applies if there is no independent evidence that the crime was actually
committed, other states insist that confessions should be corroborated in all cases,
since:
[t]here seems to be little difference in kind between convicting the
innocent where no crime has been committed and convicting the
innocent where a crime has been committed, but not by the accused ...
Indeed it is ofttimes more likely that persons giving false confessions
... will confess to crimes where there is abundant proof of the corpus
delicti.105
Yet are fears of false confessions justified? It is very difficult to assess how
frequently false confessions are made,106 but there is ample evidence that they do
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102 Smith v United States 348 US 147 at 153 (1954).
103 See Wong Sun v US 371 US 471 at 480 (1963). There are perhaps echoes of this approach in Meredith
v Lees 1992 JC 127. Reacting to the statement by Lord Justice-Clerk Ross in Greenshields v HM
Advocate 1989 SCCR 637 at 642 that ‘if there is a clear and unequivocal admission of guilt, then
very little evidence in corroboration of such an admission is required’, Lord Justice-General
Hope cautioned that this approach held dangers where there was no real evidence beyond the
confession that a crime has been committed. He added: ‘In some cases there may be ample
evidence from other sources that the crime libelled has been committed. The remaining
question will then be whether the accused committed the crime. A clear and unequivocal
confession of guilt on his part may then require little more by way of evidence to corroborate it’
(1992 JC 127 at 131). See also Sinclair v Tudhope 1987 SCCR 690 as an example of a case where
evidence of a confession was held insufficient for conviction in the absence of other evidence
that the crime was committed.
104 J. S. Millstein, ‘Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus Delicti Rule’
(1977–78) 46 Fordham Law Review 1205.
105 State v Lucas 30 NJ 37 at 57 (1959).
106 M. McConville and J. Baldwin, ‘The Role of Interrogation in Crime Discovery and Conviction’
(1982) 22 Brit J Criminol 165; K. A. Findley, ‘Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions’ (2002) 38 California Western Law Review 333 suggests
that not far short of a quarter of all wrongful convictions in the USA may be attributable to false
confessions.
occur.107 Quite apart from the situation where the suggested confession was never
in fact made,108 individuals do make false confessions for all manner of reasons.109
As the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice observed:110
(i) people may make false confessions entirely voluntarily as a result of
a morbid desire for publicity or notoriety;111 or to relieve feelings of
guilt about a real or imagined previous transgression;112 or because
they cannot distinguish between reality and fantasy; (ii) a suspect may
confess from a desire to protect someone else from interrogation and
prosecution; (iii) people may see a prospect of immediate advantage
from confessing113 (e.g. an end to questioning or release from the
police station114) ... and (iv) people may be persuaded temporarily by
the interrogators that they really have done the act in question …115
It may also be the case that a suspect simply wishes to please their interrogator.116
There may thus be a case for Scotland retaining the requirement of corroboration
in relation to confessions. But how strong a safeguard is that requirement? It may
be noted as a preliminary matter that the statement above that confessing to more
than one person or repeating the confession on different occasions does not
amount to corroboration requires qualification. In Campbell v HM Advocate117 Lord
Justice-Clerk Cullen agreed with counsel that:
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107 R. Pattenden, ‘Should Confessions Be Corroborated?’ (1991) 107 LQR 317.
108 M. McConville and J. Baldwin, Courts, Prosecution and Conviction (Oxford University Press: Oxford,
1981) 166–7.
109 T. Reik, The Compulsion to Confess (Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy: New York, 1959).
110 Above n. 96 at 57.
111 R v Sykes (1913) 8 Cr App Rep 233 at 237, Ridley J.
112 S. M. Kassin and L. Wrightsman, ‘Confessions Evidence’ in Kassin and Wrightsman (eds.), The
Psychology of Evidence and Trial Procedure (Sage: London, 1985).
113 As in Boyle v HM Advocate 1976 JC 32; where a soldier who had gone AWOL confessed to a bank
robbery, because he preferred a civilian to a military prison.
114 S. M. Kassin, S. A. Drizin, T. Grisso et al., ‘Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations’ (2010) 34 Law and Human Behavior 3.
115 Perhaps because of vulnerability or simply an exaggerated deference towards authority. See D. J.
Bem, ‘Inducing Belief in False Confessions’ (1966) 3 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 707;
G. H. Gudjonsson and K. K. Singh, ‘Interrogative Suggestibility and Delinquent Boys: An Empirical
Evaluation Study’ (1984) 5 Personality and Individual Differences 425; G. H. Gudjonsson and
B. Lebegue, ‘Psychological and Psychiatric Aspects of Coerced-Internalized False Confessions’
(1989) 29 Journal of the Forensic Science Society 261.
116 E. D. Driver, ‘Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion’ (1968) 82 Harv L Rev 42.
117 1998 JC 130.
Evidence of an accused giving an instruction, making a promise or
expressing his thanks in circumstances which were directly related to
the commission of a crime should be regarded as incriminating
conduct rather than an admission of past conduct ... [This] evidence
provided a separate source of evidence against [the accused] in
addition to the [confession].118
Thus evidence that Campbell had thanked an accomplice after the commission of
the crime was held to amount to corroboration of his confession. More impor-
tantly, however, the doctrine of corroboration operates rather differently in
relation to confessions. As Lord Dunpark put it in Hartley v HM Advocate:119
The standard of corroboration of an unequivocal confession of guilt
is, in my opinion, different from the standard to be applied when
seeking corroboration of a Crown eye-witness … The reason for the
different standard is that, unlike such other evidence, the confession
of guilt by an accused person is prejudicial to his own interests and
may, therefore, initially be assumed to be true. Accordingly, one is not
then looking for extrinsic evidence which is [more] consistent with his
guilt than with his innocence, but for extrinsic evidence which is
consistent with his confession of guilt. If, therefore, a jury is satisfied
that a confession of guilt was freely made and unequivocal in its
terms, corroboration of that confession may be found in evidence
from another source or other sources which point to the truth of the
confession.120
In other words, a confession can almost corroborate itself in the sense that corrob-
oration can be found in the fact that the circumstances of the crime coincide with
the confession.
This approach might be seen to make perfect sense in cases like Manuel v HM
Advocate,121 where the confession revealed details which only the perpetrator could
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118 Ibid. at 137.
119 1979 SLT 26.
120 Ibid. at 33.
121 1958 JC 41. A similar approach is to be found in A. J. Alison, Principles and Practice of the Criminal Law
of Scotland, Vol II (1833) 580–1: ‘if a person is apprehended on a charge of theft, and he tells the
person who seized him, that if he will go to such a place, and look under such a bush, we will find
the stolen goods; or he is charged with murder or assault, and he says that he threw the bloody
weapon into such a pool, in such a river, and it is there searched for and found; without doubt
these are such strong confirmations of the truth of the confession, as renders it of itself sufficient
... to convict the prisoner’.
know. Manuel had indicated in his confession where he had left the victim’s body
and certain items of her clothing, then led the police to the body itself. In such a
case the concern that the confession might be fabricated is largely absent.122
However, the approach also seems to prevail when there is no such safeguard.123
Thus in McAvoy v HM Advocate124 it was no bar to conviction that the coincidence of
the details of the confession with those of the crime providing corroboration was
largely in the public domain. Lord Hunter opined that it was ‘not … necessarily
fatal ... that persons other than the accused had become aware of the facts and
circumstances used as corroboration of a detailed confession before the
confession itself had been made’.125 Similarly, Lord Justice-General Emslie, deliv-
ering the opinion of the court in Wilson v HM Advocate,126 observed that it was ‘not
for the trial judge to evaluate the weight that should be given to the circumstance
that [by the time the confession was made] many people knew or had heard of
many of the details of the crime. That was essentially a matter for the jury to
consider’.127 In the same way, the fact that an accused can advance an innocent
explanation for the ‘special knowledge’ revealed in a confession does not mean
that it can no longer corroborate. It is once more for the jury to decide what to
make of such an explanation. Thus in Andrew v HM Advocate128 in which the accused
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122 But not wholly absent, since quite apart from the situation where the very fact of the confession
is fabricated, the possibility exists that a suspect may have been persuaded what to say by his
interrogators. This may happen without any deliberate intent on the part of such interrogators:
A. Kellam, ‘A Convincing False Confession’ (1980) 130 NLJ 29.
123 Scots law seeks to protect against the situation that a special knowledge confession may not have
been made at all by demanding corroboration of the fact that the confession actually occurred.
Thus Lord Justice-Clerk Ross noted in Low v HMA 1994 SLT 277 at 287 that ‘[n]ormally an admission
spoken to by one witness may be corroborated by other evidence. … However, a circumstantial or
special knowledge admission is in a different situation … there must be evidence from two
witnesses to the effect that the accused made the statement attributed to him’. He later qualified
that in Mitchell v HM Advocate 1996 SCCR 97 to make clear that it was the fact of the making of the
special knowledge confession which required corroboration, not every detail of that confession.
He observed (at 99) that ‘[w]hat the court laid down [in Low] was that it was the making of the
alleged confession by the accused which required to be proved by two witnesses. The court did
not say that each and every element which was alleged to constitute special knowledge required
to be spoken to by two witnesses’. The reasoning behind this approach is presumably that while
one witness might falsely claim that a suspect made a special knowledge confession, it is unlikely
that more than one witness would do so. It may be wondered how realistic such a view is. It might
be added that where an accused has made two separate special knowledge confessions, there is
no need to have corroboration as to their making: Murray v HM Advocate 2009 JC 266.
124 1983 SLT 16.
125 Ibid. at 20.
126 1987 JC 50.
127 Ibid. at 54.
128 2000 SLT 402. See also Cairns v Howdle 2000 SCCR 742 where the accused suggested that he had
derived his special knowledge from witnessing the crime.
suggested at his judicial examination that he had overheard the details of the
crime revealed in his ‘confession’, Lord Justice-Clerk Cullen noted that:
the jury had before them evidence of statements made by the
appellant which they were entitled to regard as evidence that the
appellant displayed the knowledge of the circumstances of the crime
which would be possessed by a perpetrator. The fact that the jury
heard that at judicial examination he gave a different explanation did
not affect the position. Even if he had given evidence to the same
effect, which he did not, it would have been for the jury to decide
whether that evidence led them to reject what he had said to the
police.129
Nor is it any bar to a confession providing its own corroboration that only
some of its points coincide with the details of the crime, while others are
actually at odds with those details. Lord Justice-Clerk Wheatley remarked in
Gilmour v HM Advocate:130 ‘Where a statement contains points of identity and points
of discrepancy, then, … it is for the jury to decide whether they are going to accept
and proceed upon the points of identity, and if they do so the only question then is
whether these points are sufficient in law to constitute corroboration of the
admission of guilt’.131
It can be seen then that the safeguard provided by the insistence that a
confession must be corroborated has been significantly weakened. Special
knowledge confessions can corroborate when the knowledge revealed is not so
special, in that it is shared by many or could have been acquired other than by
being the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, a special knowledge confession can
still corroborate even if parts of it are entirely inaccurate. To say that such
matters are capable of being weighed by the jury is especially problematic,
since all available evidence indicates that juries are particularly impressed by
confessions;132 thus the chances of being acquitted in such circumstances are
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130 1982 SCCR 590.
131 Ibid. at 607.
132 See A. P. Sealy and A. McKew, ‘The Effect of Confession and Retraction on Simulated Juries’ in S. M.
Lloyd-Bostock (ed.), Psychology in Legal Contexts: Applications and Limitations (Palgrave Macmillan:
Oxford, 1981); S. M. Kassin and K. Neumann, ‘On the Power of Confession Evidence: An
Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis’ (1997) 21 Law and Human Behavior
469.
133 McConville and Baldwin, above n. 108 at 159.
very low,133 especially as judges in Scotland do not routinely warn juries of
the dangers of relying on uncorroborated confessions, as happens in certain
other jurisdictions.134 Admittedly, in this context the court is more open to the
admissibility of expert evidence in relation to the reliability of confessions.
Thus experts can be heard on such matters as an accused’s peculiar susceptibility
to pressure when questioned by the police,135 and the likelihood that several
people who heard a statement could each recall it in almost identical terms.136
However, special circumstances must be present before expert evidence may be
admitted.
To what extent do the points made above undermine the case for seeking to retain
the corroboration requirement in relation to confessions? Assuming that the case
for dispensing with a general corroboration requirement is accepted, it might be
argued that any suggestion that it be retained for particular forms of evidence
must be justified by fairly strong arguments. We suggest that there are indeed
compelling arguments in favour of demanding that confessions should continue
to require to be corroborated. The fact that the Scottish courts have tended to
undermine the effect of this safeguard in certain ways does not mean that the
requirement is no safeguard at all. It may even be argued that if the legislature
were to signal the continuing importance of corroboration in this area by
retaining the requirement, the courts might reconsider their approach. That
might not be entirely fanciful, as there have been cases which have gone against
the general trend and sought to confine special knowledge confessions to their
proper sphere. Thus in Woodland v Hamilton137 Lord Sutherland (delivering the
opinion of the court) stated:
We consider that the test to be applied is whether the matters about
which an accused person speaks are things of which he would have no
reason to be aware if he was not the perpetrator of the crime. Putting
it another way, does he have special knowledge the only reasonable
explanation of which is that he was the perpetrator?138
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137 1990 JC SLT 565.
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Similarly there are suggestions in Hamilton v Normand139 that if details are drawn
from the accused by specific questioning by the police when they are already in
possession of those details, it is not safe to find corroboration in the coincidence
between the details and the confession. If such authorities were to be reasserted,
then the corroboration requirement would be a real safeguard.
An alternative approach might be to frame the statutory exception, so that it was
made clear that a confession required to be corroborated by evidence which was
independent of the confession itself. Could a statutory rule be devised, which
allowed for special knowledge corroboration, but kept it in the appropriate
sphere? For example, legislation could provide that: ‘A confession requires to be
corroborated by evidence independent of the confession, except where the
confession reveals special knowledge of the crime, the only reasonable expla-
nation of which is that the accused was the perpetrator’. It may be that the courts
would find a way to interpret this so as to reinstate the current approach to special
knowledge confessions, but no statutory language is ever judge-proof, and
ultimately the legislature must trust the judiciary in such matters. Provision
could also be made for expert testimony to be admitted, to explain to jurors that
not all ‘confessions’ are genuine. Without such expert evidence to guide them,
juries will struggle to fathom why an innocent person would confess to a crime.
Simply requiring a two-thirds majority in favour of a guilty verdict is unlikely to
provide any real safeguard, and certainly nowhere near as secure a safeguard as a
proper corroboration requirement.
Conclusion
Proceeding on the assumption that the general requirement for corroboration in
Scottish criminal cases is unlikely to survive, this article has considered whether
there might yet be room to retain a corroboration requirement in relation to one
or both of two types of problematic evidence. As regards visual identification
evidence, the article has shown that this type of evidence is prone to produce
unsafe convictions, and that the requirement of a two-thirds jury majority in
favour of conviction is most unlikely to have any effect on that tendency. It has to
be conceded, however, that any safeguard which the corroboration requirement
might have provided in this area has been weakened by the way in which the
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139 1994 SLT 184 at 187, per Lord Justice-Clerk Ross: ‘I find it difficult to regard the confession in the
present case as a special knowledge confession when the special knowledge attributed to the
appellant did not emerge voluntarily and spontaneously but in response to leading questions
from the police officers. In such a situation it can hardly be contended that the appellant can only
have acquired his knowledge ... as perpetrator’. But compare the dissenting judgment of Lord
Morison at 189.
Scottish courts have developed the law. Since the problems with this type of
evidence lie in its very nature, the conclusion is that it would be more productive
to seek to improve the quality of such evidence by prohibiting dock identification,
and allowing expert testimony to be led to explain the problematic nature of some
forms of identification. In respect of confessions, it has been shown that uncorrob-
orated evidence of this type is similarly problematic, and that increasing the
jury majority is a poor substitute for a corroboration requirement. The article
expresses concern regarding the way in which the courts have weakened corrobo-
ration as a safeguard in this area, but sees this not as an argument for abandoning
the requirement, but for restoring, and indeed strengthening, the original effect
of that requirement, aided by appropriate statutory provisions.
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